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Through significant public and private investment, autonomous 
vehicle (AV) technology continues to develop rapidly. Industry development 
has bifurcated into two sectors.1 One industry sector has focused on 
introducing limited autonomous features such as lane and speed assist 
capabilities. Tesla’s Autopilot technology is a widely known example of this 
type of AV system. The other group has focused on introducing almost fully 
autonomous vehicles within very limited constraints, such as shuttles on 
college campuses or in designated pilot program areas. Pilot programs of 
these fully autonomous vehicles are considered to be state of the art for AVs, 
 
1 Automated Vehicles for Safety, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., https://www. 
nhtsa.gov/technology-innovation/automated-vehicles-safety#topic-benefits [https://perma. 
cc/WY6N-B2SJ] (last visited Dec. 4, 2021) (describing the progress made on fully 
automated and partially automated vehicles) [hereinafter NHTSA AV SAFETY WEBPAGE]. 
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and pose drastically different safety questions because they travel for long 
periods with no additional inputs from human operators.2  
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has 
highlighted four areas of potential benefit from autonomous vehicles: 
increased safety though reduction of driver error; economic benefits from 
American leadership in new technology; efficiency and convenience that will 
allow all industries to be more productive; and freedom of mobility for people 
who are unable to drive.3 The United States (U.S.) government and nearly all 
autonomous vehicle manufacturers identify public safety as their primary 
consideration in the development of this new technology. NHTSA’s Fatality 
Analysis Reporting System reported that 36,096 people died from motor 
vehicle crashes in the United States in 2019.4 By decreasing the possibility of 
human error, impairment, and distraction while driving, autonomous vehicles 
have enormous potential to save lives and reduce the economic burden 
associated with crashes.5  
Although the development and adoption of autonomous vehicle 
technology represents an opportunity to improve public safety, that benefit 
will only materialize if autonomous vehicles are themselves safe.6 In the 
United States, an overlapping system of state and federal regulation, 
consumer information channels, international standards, and tort liability 
provides assurance of safety for automobiles.  
Innovation in this space could be greatly enhanced by a “regulatory 
sandbox” governance model for ensuring the safety of new technologies. The 
regulatory sandbox model, originally applied to financial technologies 
(FinTech) products, involves providing newly developing technologies with 
a limited space in which they are free to innovate. This usually involves 
exemptions from existing regulations that would prevent real-world testing 
of the new technology, but with strict limitations in scope and duration, 
requirements to continuously disclose data, and procedures for updating 
exemption scope in response to positive or negative evidence from existing 
trials.  
Many aspects of current U.S. policy for allowing limited testing of 
autonomous vehicles constitute a regulatory sandbox, but conscious 
 
2  FORD MOTOR CO., A MATTER OF TRUST, FORD’S APPROACH TO DEVELOPING SELF-
DRIVING VEHICLES 11 (2018) (illustrating Ford’s pilot programs for their fully autonomous 
vehicles). 
3 NHTSA AV SAFETY WEBPAGE, supra note 1. 
4 Id. 
5 See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL & U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., ENSURING AMERICAN 
LEADERSHIP IN AUTOMATED VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES: AUTOMATED VEHICLES 4.0 2 (2020) 
[hereinafter Automated Vehicles 4.0] (“By eliminating the possibility of human error or poor 
human choices (e.g., impairment or distraction) while driving, [AVs] ha[ve] enormous 
potential to save lives and reduce the economic burden associated with crashes.”). 
6 Id. at 4. 




adherence to a sandbox-style model could improve public safety and hasten 
innovation. For instance, NHTSA has granted limited waivers from Federal 
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards granted to the autonomous delivery service 
company, Nuro, and California has granted on-road state testing permits to 
more than fifty AV development companies.7 These waivers and permits all 
contain limited requirements for data reporting and collaboration with 
regulators.8 However, the data collected in these environments is not 
sufficient for the regulators to form safety assurance protocols in the future. 
Safety assurance testing performed by regulators for autonomous vehicles 
will likely involve a combination of simulation, closed circuit testing, and on-
road testing. While data reported by Nuro to NHTSA is more comprehensive, 
autonomous vehicle testing companies in California only submit basic 
information about the frequency of “disengagements,” which are instances in 
which a human operator must retake control of a vehicle.9 This low level of 
data reporting is not sufficient to evaluate the safety of autonomous vehicles, 
and it will not support a regulatory agency’s work to establish safety 
standards in the future.10  
Part II of this paper describes the concept of safety assurance, 
describes challenges for assurance measurements in autonomous vehicles, 
and presents common methods of safety assurance applied in other regulatory 
environments. Part III describes the key features of regulatory sandboxes and 
considers how they might apply to autonomous vehicle safety assurance 
challenges. Part IV describes the complex and overlapping regulatory 
approach for evaluating safety assurance in traditional automobiles and how 
that approach applies to autonomous vehicle testing. Part V concludes with 
the recommendation that policy makers implement a regulatory sandbox 
model as a way to not only ensure public safety while leaving space for 
innovation but also as a way to build regulatory expertise that will enable 
appropriate formal rulemaking governing autonomous vehicles by the time 







7 Press Release, Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., NHTSA Grants Nuro Exemption 
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A. Functional Safety and Assurance Through Policy 
 
 1. Functional safety 
 
 Functional safety is a common term in engineering disciplines. It 
means the absence of unreasonable risk due to hazards caused by 
malfunctioning behavior or faulty design characteristics.11 What is not 
included is risks that were intentionally not designed for and not caused by 
malfunction. In the development of autonomous vehicles, not all road risks 
can be eliminated at once. Developers of autonomous vehicles choose the 
risks that they want to mitigate, and engineer solutions to avoid those risks. 
As long as the choice of risks to avoid is valid by some definition and the 
product works as intended, the vehicle will meet its functional safety goal. 
 Functional safety evaluations in industry typically involve taxonomic 
breakdowns of system components and assignments of probabilities and 
possible outcomes of failure modes of each one.12 For autonomous vehicles, 
functional safety taxonomies are the subject of a widely accepted 
international standard. The purpose of the standard is to assist developers to 
assess risk of system and component failures and mitigate their effects 
systematically, qualitatively. These taxonomies are thorough and complex. 
Functional safety standards often encourage consideration of possible risks 
at the conceptualization, product planning, and actual production stages.13 
The standards build in considerations such as cost, liability, and engineering 
feasibility to the evaluation of safety risks.14 
 
 2. Assurance 
 
 Assurance is a process that proves a product or technology is as 
functionally safe. Assurance is achieved when safe outcomes are likely to 
occur with a high level of confidence. Safety assurance can include a large  
 
11 See DNV GROUP, ISO 26262: FUNCTIONAL SAFETY FOR AUTOMOTIVE, 
https://www.dnv.com/services/functional-safety-for-automotive-iso-26262--82719 [https:// 
perma.cc/3LT3-CABW] (defining what is required to avoid unreasonable risks). 
12 See ISO 26262: ROAD VEHICLES — FUNCTIONAL SAFETY 5–6, 10 (2d ed. 2018), 
https://www.iso.org/standard/68383.html [https://perma.cc/DA2V-QMUA](last visited Mar 
18, 2021) (defining functional safety terms). 
13 Id. at vi, 23, 26. 
14 Id. at vi, 1. 




set of activities including regulatory agency evaluations of safety claims 
made by industry, simulated and live testing, presentation and analysis of 
evidence, negotiation and argumentation.15  
 
 3. Safety assurance for autonomous vehicles 
 
 Autonomous vehicles are complex enough that complete safety 
assurance may not be possible. If the computational methods that enable 
autonomous driving systems were completely logic based, then it could be 
possible to synthetically analyze safety or even do formal mathematical proof 
of safety assurance. However, an autonomous vehicle’s ability to update 
behavior based on experience and data makes such reasoning much less 
powerful.16 Still, there is a need to define a starting point for evaluating the 
coverage of assurance.  
 A series of assurance questions could be raised about whether the 
intended design of an autonomous vehicle can provide a safe transportation 
environment, assuming that it works as intended. For example, assurance is 
affected by whether an intended sensing ability or an intended operational 
limit on acceptable road surface conditions is sufficient to safely operate a 
vehicle. It is critical that these assurance claims are based on functional 
engineering measurements to enable testing of the realized product. A second 
category of assurance questions could be considered about whether an 
autonomous vehicle simply functions as intended. This second category of 
assurance questions are more similar to traditional verification and validation 








15 NAT’L INST. FOR STANDARDS AND TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS: 
VOLUME 1, OVERVIEW viii (2017), https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1500-201 [https:// 
perma.cc/9QUN-KTXY]. 
16 Ming Liang, Bin Yang, Wenyan Zeng, Yun Chen, Rui Hu, Sergio Casas & Raquel Urtasun, 
PnPNet: End-to-End Perception and Prediction With Tracking in the Loop, COMPUT. VISION 
FOUND. 11553 (IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2020), 
https://openaccess.thecvf.com/content_CVPR_2020/papers/Liang_PnPNet_End-to-
End_Perception_and_Prediction_With_Tracking_in_the_Loop_CVPR_2020_paper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/52RM-BYTH]; see Abbas Sadat, Mengye Ren, Andrei Pokrovsky, Yen-
Chen Lin, Ersin Yumer & Raquel Urtasun, Jointly Learnable Behavior and Trajectory 
Planning for Self-Driving Vehicles 3951 (IEEE/RSJ Conference on Intelligent Robots and 
Systems, 2019) [https://perma.cc/NHP5-E2TS] (explaining that the entire logic that 
translates sensor input to driving commands is usually represented by an uninterpretable 
neural network). 
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B. Common Approaches to Safety Assurance 
 
 1. General aviation safety 
 
 Aviation safety assurance in the United States is formed by 
overlapping precautionary and permissive regulatory agencies. The Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) is responsible for monitoring and overseeing 
industry-led safety procedures. FAA has developed the Safety Assurance 
System (SAS) to track all required safety assurance activities including 
functional safety, security, and pilot training.17 The unified system is there to 
keep track of all the oversight activities in order to allow consideration of 
how different safety assurance evidence may compound or conflict. SAS 
automatically recommends regulatory action when oversight processes do 
not meet the relevant FAA regulations.18 
 The overlapping agency is the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB), which does not do pre-incident oversight. NTSB does thorough 
investigations of accidents and provides recommendations to airplane 
manufacturers, operators, and the FAA.19 All parties usually implement the 
recommendations.20 In addition to providing helpful recommendations that 
improve safety in the long run, the NTSB has “Go Teams” who are on call 
24/7 to rush to an accident scene as quickly as possible to gather evidence. 
Communication with the media is a critical element of the NTSB’s job. They 
have a reputation for conservative, respectful, truthful explanations of 
harrowing events, which often helps to bring calm to the terror experienced 
in the aftermath of an airplane crash.21 
 Autonomous vehicles could strongly benefit from similar NTSB 
media communication in the wake of an accident since public perception of 
AVs are critical for increased acceptance of the new technology.   
 However, general aviation safety is more similar to traditional vehicle 
safety than AV safety, because all commercial planes are still required to have 
pilots, even if flight guidance assistance or autopilot systems are engaged.22 
 
17 See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., SAFETY ASSURANCE SYSTEM (2019), 
https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/sas/ [https://perma.cc/8GM4-ZPBF] (explaining the 
function of SAS). 
18 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., WHAT IS THE FAA SAFETY ASSURANCE SYSTEM? AN OVERVIEW 
FOR CERTIFICATE HOLDERS AND APPLICATIONS 25, 36 (2019). 
19 Eric Fielding, Andrew W. Lo & Jian Helen Yang, The National Transportation Safety 
Board: A Model for Systemic Risk Management, J INV. MGMT. 17, 19 (2011) 
20 Id. at 7. 
21 Id. at 12. 
22 See MICHAEL KASZYCKI, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY CIRCULAR NO. 25.1329-1C, 
APPROVAL OF FLIGHT GUIDANCE SYSTEMS 14 (2014) https://www.faa.gov/documentLib 
rary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_25_1329-1C.pdf [https://perma.cc/T28N-4RD4] 
(outlining the requirements of federal regulation). 




In fact, unlike human automobile drivers or even AV systems, aircraft pilots 
are required to rigorously pass simulated flight tests in adverse conditions 
before receiving their license.23  
 Autonomous unmanned aircraft are more similar in concept to 
autonomous vehicles. Regulators will face the same basic questions—how 
can do we assure that autonomous systems are safe and reliable for civil 
aviation? Similar regulatory hurdles initially existed for unmanned 
autonomous aircraft related to driver requirements—unmanned aircraft may 
not operate in civil airspace without a Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) certificate of waiver or authorization (COA).24 There is also a strong 
consensus that existing verification and validation methods are not adequate 
to assure safe operation of an advanced autonomous system.25  
 While AV regulatory integration issues are mainly under the 
assumption that a driver would always somehow recognize and take 
extraordinary action in the case of a critical failure of a vehicle component, 
unmanned aircraft face a different issue. Current aircraft regulations are 
primarily concerned with protecting individuals inside planes, but unmanned 
vehicle safety should focus on the safety of people on the ground.26  
 At the 2014 Verification & Validation Summit, a representative from 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) proposed a 
sandbox-like approach where autonomous aircraft could only be allowed to 
fly inside a particular geographic area that posed minimal risk while allowing 
its intended purpose.27 The representative also proposed a design process and 
product performance-based certification system that blended concepts of 
operations approval with final fight tests and adverse condition simulations.28   
 
 2. Electricity grids 
 
 In regulation of the electricity grid, regional grid operators elect to 
keep contingency plans for many possible permutations of asset failure.29 The 
binding regulation is actually a performance standard called the Power 
 
23 See Stan Greenspan, How Much of a Pilot's Training Is Emergency Landing Practices?, 
SLATE (Mar. 20, 2017), https://slate.com/human-interest/2017/03/how-much-of-a-pilots-
training-is-emergency-landing-practices.html [https://perma.cc/S6KV-P7U3] (“Flying 
lessons are not so much about flying but about emergencies”). 
24 See NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, AUTONOMY RESEARCH FOR CIVIL AVIATION: TOWARD A NEW 
ERA OF FLIGHT 3 (2014). 
25 Id. at 37–38. 
26 Id. at 41. 
27 SHARON GRAVES, TRUSTED AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS (9th Annual Verification & 
Validation Summit, 2014). 
28 Id. at 18. 
29 IGNACIO PEREZ-ARRIAGA ET AL., UTILITY OF THE FUTURE: AN MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE 
RESPONSE TO AN INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION 22–23 (2016). 
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Quality Envelope.30 This standard is enforced by extremely high costs if the 
grid fails to provide adequate power to consumers for a set number of hours 
out of the year.31  
 This type of regulation for AV systems might involve standards 
limiting the quantity of accidents, or other adverse driving events. 
Conversely, a regulator could require that an AV must maintain certain 
driving quality standards related to acceleration/deceleration to ensure that 
passengers are safe and comfortable.32   
 
 3. Nuclear reactors  
 
 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has established the 
Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) to ensure the safety of operational nuclear 
reactors. Under ROP, NRC designated seven key safety areas that require 
constant measurement and reporting.33 These include event contingency 
scenarios and emergency preparedness for initiation events and constant 
state-of-health concerns such as radiation barrier integrity. NRC has 
established measurement parameters that are reported on by the operators.34 
Essentially, the only regulatory decision that is made is whether to increase 
scrutiny beyond constant surveillance. If any of these seven factors are not 
adequately addressed, then inspections and collaborative mitigation 
procedures are triggered. This situation is a clear example of a precautionary 
policy.35 
 Some states already require companies to report every traffic incident 
involving an autonomous vehicle.36 With increased ability to transmit and 
process data, it is possible that certain vehicle parameters could be regularly 
reported to a regulatory agency. Even if those parameters were as simple as 
sensor data for the ten seconds before and after an accident or near miss event,  
 
30 ELENA FUMAGALLI, FLORENCE DELESTRE & LUCA LO SCHIAVO, HANDBOOK OF SERVICE 
QUALITY REGULATION IN THE ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION AND RETAIL SECTORS 79, 90 
(2006) (outlining the regulatory instruments and process). 
31 PEREZ-ARRIAGA, supra note 25, at 168. 
32 Il Bae, Jaeyoung Moon & Jeongseok Seo, Toward a Comfortable Driving Experience for 
a Self-Driving Shuttle Bus, 8 ELECS. 943, 944 (2019). 
33 U.S. NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N, REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS 2 (2021), 
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html (last visited Mar 25, 2021) 
[https://perma.cc/7F2U-BEWS] (using a graphic to outline oversight framework). 
34 U.S. NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N, MANAGEMENT DIRECTIVE 8.13, REACTOR OVERSIGHT 
PROCESS 5–6 (2018), https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1734/ML17347B670.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/PN4G-5Q4Q]. 
35 Id. at 9, 11. 
36 CAL. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE COLLISION REPORTS (2021) 
https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/vehicle-industry-services/autonomous-vehicles/autono 
mous-vehicle-collision-reports/ [https://perma.cc/N8BA-HJFF]. 




such data aggregation may allow regulators to detect systemic issues with 
AVs earlier than they would if they waited for consumers to report 
problems.37  
 
 4. FDA pre-market approval 
 
 In some areas of consumer protection regulation, Congress has chosen 
to require pre-market approval for new products. The U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) oversees rigorous standards for proving effectiveness 
and safety within guidelines developed through administrative law processes. 
The main advantages of this type of system are higher trust in medical 
products (which can lead to widespread adoption) and less preventable harm 
to consumers. Major downsides include high costs, slower innovation (which 
means that consumers must wait to receive products that could help them), 
and still no guarantee that all detrimental effects are uncovered by the pre-
market testing process. In the context of human medicine, the wide variance 
in human reaction to treatment and the long latency period of carcinogenic 
harm represent the residual risk.  
 The FDA pre-market approval mechanism for new health care 
treatments is notoriously expensive to navigate. Phase I and II of the approval 
process involve small, randomized control trials to determine if treatments 
are harmful and effective. In Phase III of the approval process, the treatment 
is given to larger quantities of patients for the first time. This protracted 
process causes innovation to move slowly because small improvements are 
not worth re-applying for approval.38 In addition, once a treatment has 
approval, most people assume that the treatment is entirely safe. Post market 
evaluation is a low priority, although it does detect issues when the adverse 
effects are severe or conspicuous (as they were with Thalidomide).39 A 
rigorous pre-market testing program for AVs would be inappropriate and 
antithetical to NHTSA’s goal of fostering innovation.  
 H.G. Eichner, Ken Oye, and others have proposed a change to the 
FDA approval process that lowers the pre-market approval standard but 
drastically raises the post-market study of treatments.40 They propose that 
during the later stages of randomized control trials of a new treatment but 
before the treatment is officially licensed, the treatment should be offered to 
the any member of the public who wishes to take the treatment and also join 
an observational data collection program. By allowing free entry into the 
 
37 Id. 
38 Rachel E. Sachs, Regulating Intermediate Technologies, 37 YALE J. REG. 219, 244–45 
(2020). 
39 H. G. Eichler et al., Adaptive Licensing: Taking the Next Step in the Evolution of Drug 
Approval, 91 Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics 426, 432 (2012). 
40 Id. at 434, 436. 
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market but investing in the maintenance of public health data registries, 
health care costs could be lower, innovation could move faster, and many 
adverse effects would be detected that previously may never have been 
discovered.41 This type of proposal is a rather extreme version of a sandbox 
model, where the scope of initial tests are not very limited.  
 Regardless of what pre-market approval mechanism is adopted for 
AVs, national registries of accident data and performance issues should be a 
priority for continued research that will enable adaptive policy decision 
making. Given the complexity of adaptive autonomous systems, statistical 
analysis of overall performance may be one of the only ways that a regulator 
could confidently assess the safety of an AV. While NHTSA currently 
maintains accident data, expanding the type of data collected from drivers 
could enable a measurement of safety assurance.  
 
II. REGULATORY SANDBOXES 
 
 Regulatory sandboxes were first introduced in the United Kingdom in 
2015 to regulate financial firms.42 In that context, they were meant to be “a 
‘safe space’ in which businesses can test innovative products… without 
immediately incurring all the normal regulatory consequences of engaging in 
the activity in question.” The term “sandboxing” has traditionally been 
limited to use in software development to describe a restricted environment 
where it is safe to test untrusted code without fear of destroying equipment 
or affecting other parts of a multi-person project.43  
 Typically, regulatory agencies take on the primary objective of public 
safety, which can cause the agencies to lock in the status quo in an effort to 
prevent new risks.44 In contrast, sandboxes allow experimental flexibility for 
industry while still providing critical limitations to prevent public harm.  
 Jacob Sherkow, Professor at the University of Illinois College of Law, 
described a regulatory sandbox as a policy to “allow developers to deploy the 
technology in the wild to capture real-world user behavior and required the 
developers to report data back to the agency so the agency can effectively 
monitor the technology.”45 Sherkow also suggested that sandboxes have 
certain process elements to make them effective: collect data, set up 
procedures to adapt regulation in response to input from industry, grant  
 
41 Id. at 427. 
42Jacob S. Sherkow, Regulatory Sandboxes and the Public Health, U. ILL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 9) (available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3792217). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 11. 
45 Id. at 12. 




authorizations that are broad enough to cover iterations of new technologies, 
use the real-world environment, and be limited in terms of use, scope, and 
duration.46  
 
A. Motivations and Characteristics 
 
 1. Tension between innovation and safety assurance 
 
 Traditional regulation can be conceptually placed on a spectrum that 
describes the level of risk acceptance allowable in an industry. Usually, when 
risk is low or widely dispersed, regulation is permissive.47 Permissive 
regulation allows innovation and freedom unless consumer safety is 
demonstrated to be clearly compromised by a particular company. 
Enforcement of permissive regulation only occurs if adverse events actually 
take place.48 Even under permissive regulation, the potential public backlash 
to gross danger can cause temperance on the part of innovators.49 Permissive 
regulation on its own does not reflect sandbox style regulation because 
penalties for adverse events are severe, and because there are few limits on 
the ability to tests new products. The balance between innovation and safety 
is shifted towards innovation.  
 On the other hand, when risks are high or when impact is particularly 
conspicuous, policies tend to be precautionary.50 Precautionary policies use 
constant oversight and pre-market approval to test every innovation before 
exposing the public to the risk it may pose.51 In the testing of autonomous 
driving systems, a rigorous pre-market testing system could be developed. It 
would likely involve hundreds of traffic situations, which must each be tested 
 
46 Id. 
47 H-G Eichler et al., supra note 35, at 427–28. 
48 Fielding, supra note 15, at 27. 
49 See NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., HWY18MH010, COLLISION BETWEEN VEHICLE 
CONTROLLED BY DEVELOPMENTAL AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEM AND PEDESTRIAN (2019) 
(Identifying the probable causes of a crash involving a pedestrian, Elaine Herzberg, and an 
Uber test vehicle in Tempe, Arizona); Ryan Randazzo, Who Was Really at Fault in Fatal 
Uber Crash?, AZCENTRAL (Mar. 17, 2019), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/ 
tempe/2019/03/17/one-year-after-self-driving-uber-rafaela-vasquez-behind-wheel-crash-
death-elaine-herzberg-tempe/1296676002/ [https://perma.cc/NVT9-J82P] (“The fallout 
from the Tempe crash . . . would promptly drive Uber’s autonomous program out of 
Arizona”). 
50 Fall 2010 Recap: Risk Regulation Seminar Series, REG. REV. (Nov. 22, 2010), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2010/11/22/fall-2010-recap-risk-regulation-seminar-series/ 
[https://perma.cc/B77R-MNEK]. 
51 Nicolas A. Ashford, The Legacy of the Precautionary Principle in U.S. Law: The Rise of 
Cost-Benefit Analysis and Risk Assessment as Undermining Factors in Health, Safety and 
Environmental Protection, in IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: APPROACHES 
FROM THE NORDIC COUNTRIES, EU & USA 352, 353 (2012), http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1 
/38470 [https://perma.cc/HVU7-78UL]. 
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multiple times for different environmental and operational conditions. 
Significant testing of failure response would also be required. This brief 
description underestimates the difficulty and time that would be required to 
conduct such testing. Setting such a high bar for pre-market approval would 
add cost and slow down innovation in a nascent industry and may hurt the 
competitiveness of American manufacturers. Precautionary regulation does 
not constitute sandbox style regulation. Here, the balance between innovation 
and safety is shifted towards safety.  
 Regulatory sandboxes are intended to be used in environments where 
innovation needs a push to overcome a strict regulatory environment. Cass 
Sunstein, who served as administrator of the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs during the Obama administration, has criticized over-
regulation of new technologies as “counter-productive, ineffective, [and] 
overly costly”.52 While innovation can benefit from clarity in liability rules, 
strict prescription to particular technologies or even specific operational 
performance metrics can stifle innovation if implemented too early in the life 
of an industry.53 
 Often, executive agencies deal with this problem by waiving 
regulations for developing technologies wholesale. For instance, the EPA has 
the authority to waive air pollution control regulations for potential polluters 
who are testing a new pollution control technology.54 But this type of waiver 
is more dangerous when unregulated industry could cause immediate health 
effects. Instead of a waiver, agency-granted permission to test well defined 
new technologies for limited amounts of time with the promise to share data 
describing the results would provide industry with an avenue for less 
encumbered innovation while still ensuring public safety.  
 
 2. Collect evidence of safety and efficacy for new technologies 
 
 Data collection is a critical aspect of regulatory sandbox design, and 
one that is likely to be hotly contested by market participants.55 Collection 
and reporting of data from industry testing is costly, and companies are often 




52 Cass Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 Duke L.J. 607, 630–31 (1991) (explaining 
the mixed record of regulation). 
53 Nicholas A. Ashford & Ralph P. Hall, Regulation-Induced Innovation for Sustainable 
Development, 37 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 21, 21 (2012) (explaining the Porter hypothesis, 
which asserts that some environmental regulations can encourage technological innovation,  
and the impact of regulation on innovation). 
54 42 U.S.C. § 7411. 
55 Sherkow, supra note 42, at 29. 




 For AV manufacturers that participate in a regulatory sandbox, a 
specific set of data should be collected that includes, as a minimum, black-
box sensor input and control data in the ten seconds before a disengagement. 
Disengagements are instances in which a human operator must retake control 
of the car. These data are critical for regulators to understand not only 
frequency of accidents but also causes.  
 Sharing of black-box data from all disengagements would provide 
regulators with an opportunity to making decisions about the safety of an AV 
prototype prior to accidents. This is appropriate because accidents occur so 
infrequently on the road. The RAND Corporation estimates that using 
frequency of accidents and disengagements during on-road testing alone 
would require more than 500 years at current testing rates to show that 
autonomous vehicles are as safe as human drivers. The same RAND study 
concluded that autonomous vehicles “cannot drive their way to safety” and 
suggested that more rigorous data needs to be collected.   
 If NHTSA had the ability to review black-box data from 
disengagements in a way that preserved competition between firms within 
the regulatory sandbox program, then the agency may be able to develop 
technical expertise that moves the whole industry forward. Still, under such 
a program, it would be critical that NHTSA take careful precautions to make 
sure that any such data shared with the agency is secure enough to prevent 
discovery by press analysts or competing firms.  
 The type of data that is collected and reported should be specified by 
the design of the sandbox. Allowing industry to report only high-level 
summaries, or to report only data that they deem to be relevant will not 
provide agencies with the ability to meaningfully analyze safety features. 
Public safety should be prioritized over innovative ease when it comes to data 
collection in defining rules for sandboxes for AVs.  
 
 3. Adapt regulation in response to input from industry 
 
 During the sandbox period, a system of ongoing dialogue between 
regulators and industry should include the ability to update the sandbox 
without the need for formal agency rulemaking procedures.56  
 This type of adaptive policy aspires to capture the benefits of both 
permissive and precautionary policy by fostering initial applications, 
products, or technologies that have low risk, but still providing an opportunity 
 
56 See Sherkow, supra note 38, at 29 (describing how developers’ input throughout the 
application process shaped COVID-19 Emergency Use Agreements). 
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to observe and update prior knowledge of risk over time.57 It would involve 
a multi-step process that begins with presenting regulators with evidence of 
the benefits and risks of potential innovations.58  
 Adaptive policies are defined by an ability to update practices and 
regulations based on new information without formal rulemaking. A formal 
rule may establish a process for continued re-evaluation of permitted activity, 
rather than a static rule.59 This would mean that when industry decides to 
innovate in a new direction, the agency is able to amend sandbox rules to 
permit that testing. It also means that the agency could quickly rescind testing 
authorizations when new evidence shows that risks are too high.  
 Establishing an intermediate evidentiary threshold for qualification to 
participation in the regulatory sandbox is appropriate. For instance, FDA’s 
Emergency Use Authorization may authorize a drug under more relaxed 
evidentiary standards than its traditional pre-market approval system.60 All 
that is a required is a “reasonable belief” that the product will be effective, 
and that “reasonable belief” can be demonstrated by the “totality of scientific 
evidence”, including data from testing on animals and the laboratory.61  
 In addition, FDA requires a risk-benefit analysis be made in the 
context of the emergency situation. While the minimum evidentiary threshold 
is set at “totality of scientific evidence,” the risk-benefit analysis part of the 
framework allows FDA to tailor its requirements for EUAs to the specific 
situations in which they are used.62 For instance, FDA still required extensive 
pre-EUA human clinical trials for COVID-19 vaccine safety, recognizing that 
maintaining public trust in the agency is an important part of national public 






57 Lawrence E. McCray, Kenneth A. Oye & Arthur C. Petersen, Planned Adaptation in Risk 
Regulation: An Initial Survey of U.S. Environmental, Health, and Safety regulation, 77 
TECH. FORECASTIING & SOC. CHANGE 951, 951-52 (2010), https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/ 
handle/1721.1/96045/McCray-2010-Planned%20adaptation%20i.pdf?sequence=1&isAll 
owed=y [https://perma.cc/UMG7-5TLW] (pointing out that new developments in science 
and technology, as well as changes in implementation costs, can make once reasonable 
assumptions unreasonable). 
58 See id. (noting that analysts and policy officials must “formulate plausible working 
assumptions about the benefits and risks that a new policy will bring to the public”). 
59 See id. at 954 (highlighting EPA’s congressionally mandated regular reviews of air quality 
standards). 
60 See Sherkow, supra note 38, at 9 (describing the FDA’s track record of trying to define 
gene therepies as “so broad as to be essentially meaningless”). 
61 Id. at 9. 
62 Id. at 19. 
63 Id. at 28. 




 4. Grant broad authorizations for iterations of new technologies 
 
 Part of the challenge of regulatory sandboxes is that limited 
authorizations to test could quickly become obsolete when state of the art 
technology surpasses the definitions provided by the authorization.64 On the 
other hand, authorizations that are too broad might not meet the agency’s 
safety assurance needs.65 In addition, authorizations that prescribe the use of 
particular technologies can be the result of regulatory capture and can lead to 
technology lock-in effects.66 This challenge could be solved by attempting to 
adopt technology-neutral authorizations only.67    
 For autonomous vehicle development, the Department of 
Transportation (DOT) is particularly concerned that rigid, technology 
specific policies will stifle innovation. They have already adopted the policy 
to support the development of voluntary, consensus-based technical 
standards and approaches that are flexible and adaptable over time.68 This 
commitment could work well with a regulatory sandbox approach in which 
technology-neutral authorizations were granted for testing certain classes of 
products that document the use of various technical approaches without 
prescribing any of them.  
 
 5. Use the real-world environment 
 
 One important characteristic of regulatory sandboxes is that they 
allow industry to test products in the real-world environment. Two prior 
examples are financial products approved by the U.K.’s regulatory sandbox 
for financial technology (FinTech) and FDA’s Emergency Use 
Authorizations (EUAs) in the U.S. The obvious challenge is that exposing 
the public to products that are not assured to be safe necessarily exposes the 
public to risk.  
 This highlights the reason that sandboxes should only be used in areas 
where innovation is both necessary and where simulation or testing in 
controlled environments are not sufficient or possible. For financial products, 
 
64 See id. at 31 (noting that “each EUA is specific to a particular product”). 
65 See id.at 13 (contending that the experimental nature of regulatory sandboxes creates a 
“significant potential for consumer harm” by allowing a “shoot first and ask questions later” 
approach). 
66 Antje Klitkou et al., The Role of Lock-In Mechanisms in Transition Processes: The Case 
of Energy for Road Transport, 16 ENVTL. INNOVATION & SOCIETAL TRANSITIONS 22, 22–24 
(2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2015.07.005 [https://perma.cc/6FMF-FCRX]. 
67 Emma Aisbett, Wenting Cheng & Fiona Beck, Green Industrial Policy and Technology 
Neutrality: Odd Couple or Unholy Marriage? (Australian Nat’l Univ., Working Paper No. 
01-21, 2021), https://www.anu.edu.au/files/document-collection/ZCWP01-21 Green 
Industrial Policy and Technology Neutrality_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/25DW-TMU8]. 
68 Automated Vehicles 4.0, supra note 5, at 29. 
         Journal of Law and Public Affairs       [December 2021 
 
   
 
210 
understanding consumer response to FinTech products required testing on 
real customers. For the FDA’s Emergency Use Authorization program, the 
time pressure of the COVID-19 pandemic meant traditional pre-market 
testing in clinical trials would be too slow.  
 
 6. Limited in terms of use, scope, and duration 
 
 Sandboxes balance the risks of real-world testing by limiting the 
authorized activity in use, scope, and duration. Limiting product testing by 
use provides boundaries for how the product interacts with the world. Each 
new financial product in the U.K. had to define the boundaries of its intended 
use before getting authorization.  
 Limitations on scope narrow the area of the real world that can be 
affected by the untested technology. For autonomous vehicles, pilot programs 
that limit the use of the vehicle to a college campus or retirement community 
are examples of scope limitations.  
 Limitations on duration prevent the regulatory sandbox from 
becoming a permanent regulatory fixture. While a regulatory sandbox 
provides a way for the new technology to develop and a way for regulators 
to learn more about the technology, regulatory sandboxes do not protect the 
public to the extent that evidentiary standards are lower than normal. They 
also do not carry the helpful public accountability features of formal 
rulemaking. Finally, regulatory sandbox operation can be resource intensive 
for the agency since proper administration requires constant re-consideration 
of available evidence. Defining a limitation of the duration of the sandbox 
give all parties the opportunity to move to a more stable regulatory 
environment.   
 
 7. Challenges of sandboxes - public trust 
 
 One of the primary challenges that sandboxes pose is that they 
endanger public trust in a regulatory agency. This trust comes from the fact 
that real-world testing without high evidentiary standards stands in stark 
contrast with the precautionary tendencies that most agencies exhibit. It also 
stems from the fact that close collaboration with industry poses transparency 
difficulties, because industry is unwilling to share proprietary information 










 These issues were both at play for FDA in its use of Emergency Use 
Authorizations for drugs and vaccines to fight COVID-19. Polling data 
suggests that many Americans are skeptical of vaccines and lack confidence 
in that FDA is providing the country with trustworthy information.69  
 For autonomous vehicles, the data collected by prototypes is 
immensely valuable to developers, and public disclosure of detailed ride data 
is not likely to be possible. This could lead to tensions between agency 
transparency to the public, and the agency’s ability to access truly useful data.  
 
III. CURRENT AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE REGULATIONS  
 
A. The Traditional U.S. Model for Regulating Automobile Safety 
 
 1. Federal law 
 
  a. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards 
 
 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) are U.S. federal 
vehicle regulations that require particular design and performance 
requirements for all motor vehicles operated on public roads.70  After an 
FMVSS is issued, automakers certify that they have complied with the 
FMVSS before selling a vehicle. NHTSA spot checks random vehicles sold 
to the public for FMVSS compliance.  
 No current FMVSS applies to autonomous vehicles, but in the long 
run, NHTSA could issue an industry-wide FMVSS that specifies 
technological details about technologies and testing required for use in 
autonomous vehicles. All federal regulatory actions must follow the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and state regulations must follow 
equivalent statutes in their respective jurisdictions. The most important 
aspects of the APA are the requirement for notice-and-comment periods and 
the prohibition of “arbitrary and capricious” rulemaking. Agencies must 
publicly propose rules, give the public a chance to file comments, and then 
substantively respond to the comments at the time the final rule is announced  
 
69 Public Trust in CDC, FDA, and Fauci Holds Steady, Survey Shows, ANNENBERG PUB. 
POL'Y CTR., (Jul. 20, 2021) https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/public-trust-in-
cdc-fda-and-fauci-holds-steady-survey-shows/ [https://perma.cc/88B4-SFR4]. See also 
Margaret Talev, Axios-Ipsos Poll: Distrusting Big Pharma and the FDA, AXIOS (Sept. 15, 
2020), https://www.axios.com/axios-ipsos-poll-distrusting-pharma-fda-coronavirus-index-
7605a67b-606d-4e0a-b85f-1887147aa8f8.html [https://perma.cc/5AQZ-P3PR] (reporting 
on a coronavirus-related poll finding that “fewer than 1 in 10 Americans have a great deal of 
trust in the Food and Drug Administration or pharmaceutical companies . . . .”). 
70 49 C.F.R. § 571 (2006). 
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in order to satisfy the APA.71 To avoid being found invalid in federal court 
for being arbitrary and capricious, a policy must pass a cost-benefit analysis 
and be based on relevant information after documented consideration.72  
 
  b. NHTSA investigation-recall mechanism 
 
 The United States Code for Motor Vehicle Safety (Title 49, Chapter 
301) defines motor vehicle safety as “the performance of a motor vehicle or 
motor vehicle equipment in a way that protects the public against 
unreasonable risk of accidents occurring because of the design, construction, 
or performance of a motor vehicle, and against unreasonable risk of death or 
injury in an accident and includes nonoperational safety of a motor vehicle.”73 
A defect includes “any defect in performance, construction, a component, or 
material of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment.”74 Generally, a 
safety defect is defined as a problem that exists in a motor vehicle or item of 
equipment that both poses a risk to safety and exists in a group of vehicles of 
the same design or manufacture.75  
 NHTSA relies on consumer reporting to identify defects. Agency 
technical experts review every call, letter, and online report of an alleged 
safety problem filed with NHTSA. If safety issue reports and consumer 
petitions for investigation pass a screening process, then NHTSA will 
investigate a safety defect.76 There is no established number of reports that 
will trigger an agency investigation.77  
 During the investigative phase, Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) 
obtains information from the manufacturer (including data on complaints, 
crashes, injuries, warranty claims, modifications, and part sales) and 
determines whether further analysis is warranted.78 At this stage, the 
 
71 Administrative Procedure Act § 6, 5 U.S.C. § 555. 
72 Michigan v. EPA 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015) (interpreting the phrase “appropriate and 
necessary” to require attention to cost); Robin Kundis Craig & J. B. Ruhl, Designing 
Administrative Law for Adaptive Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 35, 49 (2014), 
https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1514&context=faculty-
publications [https://perma.cc/9M22-63C8]. See also Motor Veh. Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm 
Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (requiring an agency to consider all relevant factors when 
making regulatory decisions) 
73 49 U.S.C. §30102 (a) (8). 
74 49 U.S.C. §30102 (a) (2). 
75 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., MOTOR VEHICLE 
SAFETY DEFECTS AND RECALLS 3 (2017),  https://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/documents/ 
MVDefectsandRecalls.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YVL-ABZ9]. 
76 Id. at 8. 
77 Id. at 7. 
78 Id. at 8; NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI)—Complaints, NAT’L HIGHWAY 
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. (Nov. 2021) https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/nhtsas-office-of-
defects-investigation-odi-complaints [https://perma.cc/45WY-MJV3]. 




manufacturer has an opportunity to present its views regarding the alleged 
defect.79 Investigations are generally closed on the basis that further 
investigation is not warranted, or because the manufacturer has decided to 
conduct a recall.80 If ODI determines that more information is required, an 
investigator will undertake a more rigorous analysis.81  
 If ODI determines that a safety-related defect could exist, then the 
ODI investigator briefs a panel of experts from within the agency. If the panel 
concurs, the ODI will notify the manufacturer of the impending recall. At 
ODI’s discretion, the manufacturer may present new data before the recall 
takes effect. Only once the agency has finalized a decision to order a recall, 
may the manufacturer challenge the order in federal district court. Likewise, 
once the order is issued, a court may compel the manufacturer to comply.82  
 
  c. National Transportation Safety Board Review 
 
 The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent 
federal agency with a reputation for objectivity charged by statutory mandate 
to investigate accidents in the transportation sector.83 
 NTSB is an effective consumer protection agency in large part 
because their recommendations are carefully chosen to be specific and 
achievable. NTSB has a track record of working with agencies and other 
organizations to get them to follow through on adopting the 
recommendations. For instance, the NTSB estimates that the FAA has 
adopted 80% of the NTSB’s safety recommendations.84 
 
  d. NHTSA and IHSA rating systems 
 
 There are two US-based systems that many automakers and 
consumers rely on to test and rate car safety: NHTSA’s Stars on Cars Safety 
Rating and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) Safety Ratings. 
These systems both rely on frontal, side barrier, side pole, and rollover tests. 
After a series of crash tests, NHTSA bases its ratings on the likelihood of 
 
79 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 75, at 9. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 10. 
83 Bernard Bell, NTSB Accident Investigations and the “Consultant's Corollary,” YALE J. 
REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Jun. 30, 2021) https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/ntsb-accident-
investigations-and-the-consultants-corollary/ [https://perma.cc/RX42-WAAJ] (“The NTSB 
enjoys an extraordinary reputation for accident investigation.”). 
84 Press Release, FAA's Response to NTSB’s “Most Wanted” Safety Recommendations, Fed. 
Aviation Admin. (Mar. 16, 2021) https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/faas-response-ntsbs-most-
wanted-safety-recommendations [https://perma.cc/SX4T-TA3B]. 
         Journal of Law and Public Affairs       [December 2021 
 
   
 
214 
being injured — with a 5-star rating going to the safest vehicle possible.85 
This typically means that the vehicle has scored “good” on multiple crash 
tests. NHTSA ratings are often included on car comparison websites to help 
quickly discern which cars are safest.86 While autonomous vehicles will be 
measured by these rating systems, the driverless aspect of the vehicle is not 
likely to affect its performance on these metrics.  
 NHTSA’s five-star safety rating system is a pre-market mechanism, 
but it does not involve approval. The rating system is based on a series of 
compliance tests to make sure that vehicles have recommended features 
enabled, such as proper airbags, and limited standard crash safety 
performance tests. Given the clear objectives for safety, almost all vehicles 
are able to meet the guidelines.  
 Given enough time after consumers begin to use AVs, IIHS or other 
groups may try to develop rating systems. The difficulty of developing tests 
that completely assure safety is described below, but qualitative ratings may 
be an effective way to communicate with consumers and differentiate 
between the levels of safety of existing AVs. Such rating systems will likely 
be performance based. As with the current systems, each star in the rating 
system should have a specific meaning indicating what tests a vehicle passed 
if it receives that star. If AV developers and regulators adopt a practice of 
producing and sharing information about a vehicle’s operations state space, 
then rating systems become more powerful tools. The tests that such rating 
system developers conduct can evaluate the vehicles operational state space 
on widely understood metrics which enables better reasoning about the 
performance of the vehicle beyond the immediate results of the test.  
 
 2. State laws 
 
 For automakers navigating an overlapping system of laws, the 
automotive industry has a long history of managing differences in safety 
regulations between states and countries through homologation processes.87 
State and local regulations exist alongside federal rules governing how 
autonomous vehicles are tested and deployed. The National Governors 
Association (NGA) has claimed a role for state governments to govern 
 
85 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., Motor Vehicle Safety 
Defects and Recalls 15 (2017), https://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/documents/MVDef 
ectsandRecalls.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YVL-ABZ9]. 
86 Id. 
87 See Homologation and Global Market Access, TÜV SÜD, https://www.tuvsud.com/en-
us/industries/mobility-and-automotive/automotive-and-oem/homologation-and-global-
market-access [https://perma.cc/F52D-EMCJ] (last visited Mar. 20, 2021) (describing 
homologation as “the term for the whole vehicle approval process” and listing a number of 
services for securing European, non-European, and national approval). 




vehicle and pedestrian safety, privacy, cybersecurity, and linkage with 
advanced communications networks.88  
 
B. Autonomous Vehicles Policy 
 
 Multiple federal and state regulatory mechanisms affect the 
development of autonomous vehicles. FMVSS are designed for traditional 
vehicles and need to be updated so that vehicles remain safe when no driver 
is present. NHTSA also has the authority to grant temporary exemptions from 
FMVSS for new technologies, which they have already granted to one 
autonomous vehicle developer, Nuro, for road testing.89 A recent proposed 
rule indicated that NHTSA may impose a new safety assessment reporting 
requirement on vehicle manufacturers that must be submitted prior to testing 
or deployment of autonomous vehicles on public roads.90 NHTSA has 
already been receiving such assessments on a voluntary basis. The NTSB 
takes particular interest in accidents that involve autonomous vehicles and 
have already conducted a full-scale investigation of an autonomous vehicle 
accident that killed a pedestrian. Additionally, states may get involved in 
regulating autonomous vehicles through their authority to regulate drivers, 
vehicle registration, traffic laws and enforcement, insurance, and liability.91  
 Exemptions from FMVSSs and federal and state safety assessment 
reporting form aspects of a regulatory sandbox, but NTSB investigations and 
the eventual application of product recall mechanisms do not align with the 
regulatory sandbox model.  
 
 1. Retroactive integration of FMVSSs 
 
 The road performance of autonomous vehicles may differ 
significantly than cars with human drivers. Response times, driving styles, 
and ability to perceive certain traffic situations are different for AVs, which 
means that FMVSSs that were established under the assumption that human 
drivers would be operating vehicles will not achieve the same levels of safety 
when applied to an autonomous vehicle. The U.S. DOT has indicated that 
they will modernize or eliminate outdated regulations that unnecessarily 
impede the development of automated vehicles.92 For instance, DOT may 
 
88  NAT’L ASS’N OF GOVERNORS, GOVERNORS STAYING AHEAD OF THE TRANSPORTATION 
INNOVATION CURVE: A POLICY ROADMAP FOR STATES 1 (2018), https://www.nga.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/Transportation-Innovation-Roadmap-Final-Hi-Res-for-Posting-
Online.pdf%0Ahttps://trid.trb.org/view/1532064 [https://perma.cc/2GRP-D3EW]. 
89 Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., supra note 7. 
90 Framework for Automated Driving System Safety, 85 Fed. Reg. 78058 (proposed 
12/03/2020) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. 571). 
91 Id. at 39. 
92 Autonomous Vehicles 4.0, supra note 5, at 5. 
         Journal of Law and Public Affairs       [December 2021 
 
   
 
216 
remove references to drivers and operators of vehicles that are exclusively 
defined to be human. In a recent proposed rule, NHTSA announced that it 
would interpret “driver” as referring to the driving system, and not to any of 
the vehicle occupants. If no human occupant of the vehicle can actually drive 
the vehicle, it is more reasonable to identify the “driver” as whatever entity 
is doing the driving.93  As of March 2020, NHTSA is not revising the overall 
regulatory definition of “driver.” Instead, the agency proposed to augment 
the definition with “supporting or clarifying definitions to indicate when the 
FMVSS is referring to a human driver or an autonomous driving system.”94  
 All previous vehicle safety regulations assumed that a driver would 
be present. The tolerance thresholds for whether a particular type of vehicle 
system failure was acceptable have been set on the assumption that a human 
driver would be ready to take a non-standard action to achieve a safe 
outcome. This has several implications for AVs. The AV itself could address 
this problem technically. AVs could self-monitor vehicle system function in 
order to make proper decisions. A systems ability to properly self-monitor 
may be one whole area of safety assurance testing. For instance, if a tire 
suddenly becomes flat, the AV should be able to recognize the situation, or it 
may make inappropriate decisions. Second, when humans make decisions in 
response to system failures, drivers can provide some limitation on the 
liability that manufacturers face. AV developers will not have that potential 
liability shield. 
 
 2. Federal exemptions  
 
 NHTSA has the authority to grant an exemption from existing 
FMVSS’s to vehicle manufacturers for up to 2,500 vehicles per year. This 
authority has traditionally only been used for unique vehicles like armor-
plated security vans with components that are too heavy to comply with some 
federal standards.95  
 NHTSA granted an application for FMVSS exemptions to Nuro Inc., 
an autonomous vehicle developer in 2020. Nuro’s exemption allows it to 
operate low-speed delivery robots on public roads. NHTSA will monitor the 
testing. Nuro is required to report its operations and outcomes to NHTSA.96 
 
 
93 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., OCCUPANT 
PROTECTION FOR AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEMS, 35-36 (2020), https://www.nhtsa.gov/ 
files/occupantprotectionforadsnprmwebsiteversionpdf [https://perma.cc/WYQ9-H83Q]. 
94 Id. at 37. 
95 CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45985, ISSUES IN AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TESTING AND 
DEPLOYMENT 12 (2021). 
96 Id. 




 Exemptions of this kind fit the model for regulatory sandboxes. The 
FMVSS exemptions permit real-world testing, require data collection and 
ongoing collaboration between industry and the regulator, and they are 
limited in scope and duration.  
 In April 2021, Congress considered legislation that would authorize 
the Secretary of Transportation to provide regulatory exemptions for a larger 
set number of vehicles per year, reportedly up to 80,000, allowing automakers 
greater freedom to test in advance of a formal NHTSA rulemaking.97  
 
 3. Permitting under state and local law 
 
 Many state and local government organizations have called for reform 
to federal autonomous vehicle policy.98 A joint letter to the Chairs of the 
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce called for affirmation that state and 
local governments can promulgate new statutes and regulations governing 
roadway safety, for required submission of more detailed AV manufacturer 
reports, for greater safety assurance, for legal differentiation between pilot 
testing programs and commercial sale of autonomous vehicles, and for 
consumer education on safe use of autonomous vehicles.99  
The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) maintains a list of 
states that consider legislation related to autonomous vehicles.100 NSCL 
reports that twenty-nine states have recently enacted legislation, but that less 
than ten related to vehicle testing, licensing, or liability.101 Most legislation 





97 David Shepardson, Two U.S. Senators Make New Push to Advance Self-Driving Cars, 
REUTERS, (Apr. 22, 2021) https://www.reuters.com/world/us/exclusive-two-us-senators-
make-new-push-advance-self-driving-cars-2021-04-22/ [https://perma.cc/ZNW3-ZAMB]; 
see also Maggie Miller, Congress Makes Renewed Push on Self-driving Cars Bill, THE HILL, 
(Feb. 17, 2021), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/539063-congress-makes-renewed-
push-on-self-driving-cars-bill [https://perma.cc/P7UD-ZCWQ]. 
98 NAT’L ASS’N OF GOVERNORS, GOVERNORS STAYING AHEAD OF THE TRANSPORTATION 
INNOVATION CURVE: A POLICY ROADMAP FOR STATES  24–25 (2018). 
99 Letter from Stephen Handy & David Tarnas to James C. Owens, Acting Administrator 
Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin. (Jan. 18, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/ 
Documents/standcomm/scnri/NHTSA_ADS_ANPRM_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Q 
XV-GN34]. 
100 Autonomous Vehicles | Self-Driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, NAT'L CONFERENCE 
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 California, Arizona, Michigan, Florida, and Pennsylvania are 
considered state leaders in developing laws related to the permitting and 
deployment of autonomous vehicles.103 States that have passed legislation in 
this area tend to be very accommodating to AV developers because they are 
in competition to be the location of new development and economic 
growth.104 It may be possible that this competition ends in disaster, with 
meaningfully restrictive licensing at the state level only after a high-profile 
accident. For instance, the 2019 NTSB report highlighted Arizona’s relaxed 
permitting process as one of the contributing factors in the cause of a fatal 
crash.105 
 
 4. California 
 
 California Vehicle Code (CVC) Section 38750 charges the DMV with 
the responsibility to adopt regulations governing the testing of AVs.106 The 
California DMV requires that any operator of an AV within the state obtain 
a permit and have extensive personal accident and liability insurance.107 More 
than 50 companies hold testing permits.108  
 In terms of safety assurance, the permit application requires a 
mandatory safety self-assessment report, not unlike that requested by 
NHTSA. Specifically, the safety report must include a description of the area 
and road conditions under which a vehicle is designed to operate.109 Safety 
reports are not publicly available, because they are the property of the 
applying party.  
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COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, SEAN SLOAN’S BLOG (Mar. 9, 2018, 2:55 PM), 
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105 NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., supra note 49, at 4–5. 
106 See CAL. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Testing of Autonomous Vehicles (2018), 
https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/uploads/2020/06/Adopted-Regulatory-Text-2019-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JM8V-VNXJ] (laying out regulations that “implement, interpret, and make 
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 In addition, California prohibits operation of a vehicle without a 
driver prepared to take control of the vehicle in case of autonomous mode 
failure.110 AV manufacturers are also not permitted to receive compensation 
for providing a ride to members of the public.111  
 California requires both collision and disengagement data reporting.  
If an AV is involved in a collision, the California DMV requires 
manufacturers to publicly report the incident.112 If the vehicle’s autonomous 
driving system disengages, the California DMV requires manufacturers to 
report the location, the whether the vehicle was operating with a driver, a 
brief description of the facts that caused the disengagement, and the party that 
caused the disengagement.113  
 Taken as a whole, California’s approach provides some oversight 
without imposing costly limitations on AV developers. In this way, it follows 
the sandbox model by collecting some data, and allowing limited real-world 
testing. However, it does place liability for accidents solely on developers 
through its self-assurance and insurance requirements. In the long run, 
innovation may happen faster if states were to take responsibility for safety 
assurance, giving developers a clear hurdle to hit and beyond which they can 
innovate without great risk of liability.114 
 
 5. Voluntary safety self-assessments 
 
 As many of the current Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards do 
not apply directly autonomous vehicles, NHTSA calls on manufacturers of 
the autonomous vehicles and developers of cyber-physical systems to 
voluntary comply with several recommendations made in their automated 
vehicles policy.115 The guidance organizes the recommendations into a 
 
110 See CAL. VEH. CODE tit. 13, div. 1, ch. 1, art. 3.7 §227.38 https://www.dmv.ca.gov/por 
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114 See Ashford, supra note 49, at 21 (explaining how safety regulations can induce dramatic 
innovations in the “spurring [of] the development of new products or service by incumbent 
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https://www.nhtsa.gov/press-releases/us-dot-releases-new-automated-driving-systems-
guidance [https://perma.cc/LYZ7-U5R5] (announcing new guidance that “encourages best 
practices and prioritizes safety” while still offering manufacturers and developers regulatory 
flexibility); see also U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. & NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., 
Voluntary Safety Self-Assessment Template (2017), https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot. 
 
         Journal of Law and Public Affairs       [December 2021 
 
   
 
220 
fifteen-point assessment for manufacturers of autonomous vehicles and 
developers of cyber-physical systems to consider when following safety 
expectations: 
1. Data sharing—cyber-physical systems already account for this 
point which recommends de-identifying collected data and 
sharing information with appropriate parties for the development 
of best practices and for crash reconstruction purposes; 
2. Privacy—human drivers should be provided with a clear 
understanding of what kind of data is being collected; 
3. System safety—cyber-physical systems must respond safely to 
software malfunctions, near crashes, loss of traction, etc.; 
4. Vehicle cybersecurity—cyber-physical systems designs already 
account for this point which recommends that security be 
considered from the design phase; 
5. Human-machine interface—cyber-physical system designs must 
account for how the human driver, other cars, pedestrians, and 
people with disabilities will interact with the automated system; 
6. Crashworthiness—vehicles operated by cyber-physical systems 
must comply with NHTSA standards applicable to non-automated 
vehicles;  
7. Consumer education and training—car manufacturers must train 
sales staff and educate consumers about the capabilities and 
limitations of automated systems; 
8. Registration and certification—any significant updates or new 
automated features must be submitted in a new Safety Assessment 
report to NHTSA; 
9. Post-crash behavior—car manufacturers that use cyber-physical 
systems should prove that their cars are safe to use again after a 
crash;  
10. Compliance with Federal, State, and local laws—cyber-physical 
systems should comply with all applicable laws; 
11. Ethical considerations—automated systems should be 
programmed to account for ethical dilemmas;  
12. Operational Design Domain—cyber-physical system designs 
should clearly define and document the driving conditions under 
which the automated system is designed to operate in; 
13. Object and event detection and response—cyber-physical systems 
must be able to perceive and respond to normal driving situations 
 
gov/files/documents/voluntary_safety_self-assessment_for_web_101117_v1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P8FN-MJKJ] (last visited Mar. 8, 2021) (illustrating some information that 
manufacturers and other entities involved in the development of automated driving systems 
“may want to provide to the public to demonstrate how they are addressing safety”). 
 




like navigating traffic, heeding traffic signs, avoiding car crashes, 
etc.; 
14. Fall back (Minimal Risk Condition)—cyber-physical system 
designs should have a failsafe when encountering malfunctions 
and should be able to safely switch control to the human driver; 
15. Validation methods—developers of cyber-physical systems must 
use tests and validation methods ensure a high level of safety in 
the operation of the automated vehicles.   
While the Safety Assessment is just a recommendation by NHTSA to 
automated systems developers, the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) recommended that NHTSA should make self-driving vehicle safety 
assessments mandatory and ensure automated vehicles have appropriate 
safeguards.116  
 The DOT’s guidance under the Federal Automated Vehicles Policy 
primarily supports the development of voluntary technical standards.117 This 
would involve asking manufacturers to evaluate AV safety claims. However, 
if those tests are to be credible, then the parameters and protocols of those 
tests must be transparent and verifiable. 
 
 6. The technological sandbox: Operational Design Domain (ODD) 
 
 Engineers who develop autonomous vehicles already formally self-
impose some limitations on the autonomous vehicle testing through the use 
of an Operational Design Domain (ODD) concept. An ODD is a list of the 
operating conditions for which a particular AV prototype is designed. For 
instance, these limitations commonly include weather, time-of-day, 
“geographical, and time-of-day restrictions, and/or the requisite presence or 
absence of certain traffic or roadway characteristics.”118 ODDs take the form 
of a narrative, so that the indented use of the prototype can be communicated 
to all stakeholders.119 Currently, autonomous vehicle manufacturers develop 
an ODD for each system they build.120  
 The operational design domain concept could be considered a 
technological regulatory sandbox. Engineers allow autonomous vehicles to 
 
116 NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., supra note 49, at 3. 
117 See Autonomous Vehicles 4.0, supra note 5, at 29 (describing the federal government’s 
promotion of voluntary consensus standards through multiple updates of the Federal 
Automated Vehicles Policy, of which 4.0 is the latest). 
118 SAE INTERNATIONAL, Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to Driving 
Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles, J3016_201806. at 14. 
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operate within certain limitations. If nothing else, ODD-style limitations on 
the operations of autonomous vehicles could be a platform for collaboration 
between regulators and industry within a regulatory sandbox. Already, both 
the California DOT and NHTSA request that autonomous vehicle testing 
companies report their ODDs. However, neither regulator has taken the 
initiative to create ODDs themselves.  
 The limitation of using ODDs as a basis for a regulatory sandbox is 
that they are not intended to be specific or complete enough to assure vehicle 
safety. Safety claims that rely on an ODD would be difficult to test. For 
instance, if a vehicle manufacturer were to submit a VSSA for a vehicle with 
an ODD that claims the vehicle will operate in light snow, then several tests 
would be needed to evaluate that claim. First, tests should demonstrate that 
the vehicle can safely operate in light snow. Second, tests should demonstrate 
that the vehicle responds appropriately to heavy snow. As a preliminary 
measure, the test should demonstrate that the vehicle recognizes that it has 
encountered heavy snow. Then, a more general test showing that the vehicle 
can reach a minimal risk condition in heavy snow should be required to 
evaluate the safety claim based on the ODD. Not all elements of the ODD are 
safety relevant, but even testing compliance of all safety relevant ODD claims 
would take significant resources, especially for difficult to control 
environmental conditions.  
 
 7. Investigation-recall mechanism for autonomous vehicles 
 
 Current recall assessment policy would apply to autonomous 
vehicles. If consumers report safety issues or petition NHTSA to open a 
defect investigation, then NHTSA’s ODI will evaluate the reports and follow 
standard defect protocol for evaluating the problems. The use of this 
regulatory pathway is not likely to be relevant until consumers are able to 
purchase and use autonomous vehicles.  
 
 8. National Transportation Safety Board review  
 
 NTSB has already ruled on a high-profile AV related incident—a 
2018 accident in which a pedestrian was killed by an Uber Technologies test 
vehicle in Arizona. The NTSB investigation found that the probable cause of 
the accident was the failure of the human driver to monitor the operation of 
the AV because of distraction caused by her cell phone.121 NTSB was able to 
report that that the AV detected an object 5.6 seconds before the crash, but 
never classified that object as a pedestrian.122 
 
121 NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., supra note 49, at 4. 
122 Id. at 1. 




 NTSB’s report went further than the immediate cause of the incident. 
It also uncovered an “inadequate safety culture” at Uber Technologies, 
condemned the engineering decision to disable the vehicle’s collision 
warning and automatic emergency braking mechanism, and found that weak 
government regulation around driver training and distraction also partially 
caused the accident.123 NTSB included specific recommendations for all 
parties involved to improve their policies, and also recommended that the 
American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators coordinate 
knowledge transfer about the crash to other states and assist in developing 
stricter testing permit requirements.124  
 
C. Other Possible Approaches 
 
 1. A driver’s license for autonomous vehicles 
 
 One possible solution to safety assurance is that states develop a kind 
of drivers licensing exam for AVs. For human drivers, licensing exams are 
not intended to provide full-coverage safety assurance. Rather, they provide 
an assurance that an individual can operate a vehicle at a minimum level of 
ability. This typically involves testing informational awareness about 
identification of road features and vehicle operation, capability testing related 
to vision and reaction time and includes requirements to demonstrate limited 
operational maneuvers within a very defined scope, and training hour 
requirements. Each of these aspects to a human licensing exam could have an 
analogue for licensing an AV system.  
 While this type of safety assurance process is tempting due to its 
simplicity, policymakers should avoid such a program. First, it would likely 
confuse consumers into thinking that autonomous vehicles are to be 
considered safe. Second, the types of tests that an autonomous vehicle 
“driver’s license” would entail could be easily gamed by AV developers, 
making the test less indicative of actual roadworthiness. The most uncertain 
aspect of AV safety is not in ability to perform in well-defined, well-known 
scenarios, but in the wide range of unforeseeable scenarios that may occur on 
the road. 
 
 2. Resorting to tort law 
 
 Liability is an underlying issue of autonomous vehicles regulation.  
Autonomous vehicle developers face a difficult legal landscape because 
judges and juries are often biased against machines when they are at fault for 
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injury or death.125 Although the specific principles and criteria tend to vary 
somewhat from state to state, manufacturers can be held liable in tort under 
three general theories: negligent design, failure to warn, and (quasi) strict 
liability.  
 Tort claims can be divided into three component parts. First is what 
is sometimes called the liability component: the plaintiff must establish that 
the defendant’s actions or inactions were sufficient to hold the defendant 
legally responsible for harm caused to the plaintiff. Second is causation: the 
plaintiff must establish that the connection between the defendant’s actions 
or inactions and the plaintiff’s harm is sufficient to warrant a conclusion that 
the defendant was the legal cause of plaintiff’s harm. Third is damages: the 
plaintiff must establish that the harm suffered is of a type for which the law 
will award monetary compensation (or “damages”) to the plaintiff.   
 Proving the damages component is generally not an issue for plaintiffs 
injured as a result of vehicle crashes.  The other two components, however, 
have proven to be significant obstacles in cases seeking to hold manufacturers 
liable for injuries. The principles of negligence and strict products liability 
differ as to the liability component in all states, and as to the causation 
component in some states. Regardless of the precise formulation in the 
particular state, however, an individual court’s definition of what appropriate 
public policy is in this area looms large.  To hold an AV manufacturer liable 
in negligence for injuries inflicted by an accident caused by the autonomous 
vehicle, the plaintiff needs to show: (1) that the manufacturer owed a duty to 
the plaintiff to adhere to a particular standard of care; and (2) that the 
manufacturer “breached” that duty by failing to adhere to the requisite 
standard of care.   
 
 3. International approaches to AV safety assurance 
 
 In some countries, the operation of a vehicle on a public road almost 
always requires a driver, unless specifically exempted.126 The 1968 United 
Nations Convention on Road Traffic led to a treaty that required that a human 
driver is always responsible for the behavior of their vehicle in traffic.127 
However, countries all over the world are enacting limited permitting 
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programs. Singapore was recently ranked first on an index of pro-AV policy 
and legislation because it consolidated autonomous vehicle regulations to a 
single national agency (the Land Transport Authority) and nationally funded 
pilot programs with S$6 million (US$4.3 million).128 Singapore has also 
released a national standard to promote safe deployment.129  
 Denmark has a strong testbed environment, but an application 
procedure that requires a year or more.130 One unique feature of the Danish 




 Policy makers should make careful use of this period of autonomous 
vehicle technology development. Today, autonomous vehicles are being 
tested only in limited places, but preparations must be made for a more 
widespread transition. Because of the economic promise and potential safety 
benefits that autonomous vehicles hold, it is certain that road transportation 
will become 100% autonomous, but it is not certain how quickly a thorough 
transformation will occur.132 The question of when benefits from autonomous 
vehicles can be realized will be strongly influenced by the speed and 
efficiency of regulatory action to aid the technology adoption process.  
 In the early stages of development, autonomous vehicle development 
companies are incentivized to optimize on consumer safety in order to win 
the public’s trust. Once the public’s trust is gained, it is possible that AV 
companies optimize on other features, such as convenience, luxury, or speed 
at the expense of safety, which consumers may unwittingly accept. Just as 
Indiana Jones switched the priceless archeological artifact out for a bag of 
sand in the movie, regulation must step in precisely at that moment to 
preserve safety features in lieu of market forces that incentivize AV design 
on non-safety features. NHTSA’s success in developing appropriate formal 
rules governing AV design and performance depends on gathering thorough 
information from AV developers, starting as early as possible. 
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 The use of limited exemptions from current regulatory requirements 
for automobiles in support of on-road testing of highly autonomous vehicles 
is similar in approach to a regulatory sandbox model. Current safety data 
reporting requirements, however, are not sufficient to allow agencies to build 
expertise that will enable future regulation that keeps meaningful pace with 
new AV technology. Adherence to each of the elements of a sandbox model 
—data collection, regulatory adaptation and industry collaboration 
procedures, technology neutral regulatory exemptions that enable real-world 
testing, and strict limitations in scope and duration—would help to balance 
the need to support innovation with the need for public safety and the 
development of regulatory expertise in this area.  
 
 
